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that regardless of benign intent,
Johnson's policy of treating male and
female employees differently was facially discriminatory. To bolster its
conclusion, the Court cited the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
which provides that sex-based discrimination "includes discrimination 'because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.'" Id. at 1203 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k».
Finding Johnson's policy discriminatory, the Court proceeded to determine whether the policy could be excused as a BFOQ. After examining the
statutory basis ofthe BFOQ standard,
the Court emphasized that the defense,
particularly for safety exceptions,
"reaches only special situations." Id. at
1204-05. Such special situations recognized by the Court included permitting a prison to hire only male guards in
areas of maximum security prisons
housing males, and attempting to ensure airline safety by approving age
restrictions for airline flight engineers.
To qualify as a BFOQ, however,
the ''job qualification must relate to the
'essence,' orto the 'central mission of
the employer's business.'" Id. at 1205
(citations omitted). Relating the J ohnson facts to the BFOQ standards, the
Court concluded that the standard was
not met because a genuine concern for
future generations cannot be recast as
an "essential aspect ofbatterymaking."
Id. at 1206.
The Court also engaged in legislative history analysis of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, which has its own
BFOQ criterion. The Act provides
that, unless pregnant employees differ
in their ability to perform, they must be
treated the same as any other employee.
Further, the Act's legislative history
revealed Congress's decision to reserve to women the right to work while
pregnant, or while capable of so becoming. Because the record indicated
that pregnant women are as efficient as
other employees in the manufacture of
batteries, the Court concluded that the
standard for upholding a BFOQ had
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not been met. Having failed to establish either a business necessity defense
or a BFOQ, the Court held that
Johnson's policy constituted forbidden sex discrimination. Id. at 1207.
The Court briefly addressed the issue oftort liability. Because ''Title VII
bans sex-specific fetal- protection policies," the Court felt the risk of liability
of an employer who follows OSHA
guidelines, informs women as to the
risk, and is not otherwise negligent to
be "remote at best." Id. at 1208.
Justice White, joined by Justice
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
concurred with a portion of the
majority's rationale, as well as with the
judgment. The concurrence disagreed,
however, ''that the BFOQ defense is so
narrow that it could never justify a sexspecific fetal protection policy." Id. at
1210. White indicated that onejustification for a BFOQ would be the avoidance of substantial tort liability. As
pertaining to the facts, White felt that it
was not clear that Title VII would
preempt state tort liability. He further
stated that even if employees were
precluded from making claims for injury, their children still might be able
to do so because ''the general rule is
that parents cannot waive causes of
action on behalf of their children." Id.
at 1211.
In holding that an employer may
not discriminate against a woman on
the basis ofher pregnancy or capability
to become pregnant, the Supreme Court
has furthered the beneficient goal of
eradicating sex-based discrimnation
Bound only by moral and ethical regulation, however, expectant parents will
be forced to engage in a most difficult
balancing test, positing pecuniary interests against the interest in insuring a
healthy child.

- Howard Cohen

Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia: MARYLAND RESTRUCTURES THE
LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN NON-INTENTIONAL TORT
CASES.
In Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 601
A.2d 633 (Md. 1992), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland pronounced
sweeping changes respecting awards
ofpunitive damages in non-intentional
tort actions. In the first of three revolutionary changes to Maryland law, the
court abolished the longstanding "arising out of contract" test for punitive
damages in tort actions where the parties enjoy a contractual relationship.
Second, the court reformulated the standard for determining whether punitive
damages may be awarded by rejecting
the established "implied malice" standard and adopting the exacting "actual
malice" standard ofconduct in its place.
Third, the court announced that in all
tort cases, plaintiffs must meet the
heightened burden of proof of "clear
and convincing" evidence when seeking punitive damages.
As a result of exposure to asbestos,
plaintiffs William L. Zenobia
("Zenobia") and Louis L. Dickerson
("Dickerson") developed pleural and
parenchymal asbestosis. Zenobia alleged that he had been exposed to
asbestos while employed at various
locations over a twenty-five month
period from 1948 to 1968. Dickerson
claimed exposure to asbestos during
his employment with the Bethlehem
Steel Corporation at Sparrows Point
from 1953 until 1963.
Both plaintiffs filed claims in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking damages for their asbestos related
injuries and the complaints were consolidated for purposes of trial and appeal. At trial, the plaintiffs abandoned
all theories of liability except for strict
liability under Section 402 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The defendants included six companies that
had either manufactured or supplied
and installed products containing asbestos.
The jury awarded Zenobia com-

pensatory damages in the amount of
$1,200,000 against all four defendants
named in his suit and punitive damages were assessed against manufacturer Owens-Illinois, Incorporated
("Owens-Illinois") in the amount of
$235,000 and against supplier and installer Porter Hayden Company ("Porter Hayden") for $2,500. The jury
awarded Dickerson compensatory damages of $1,300,000 against all five
defendants named in his suit. He also
was awarded punitive damages against
Owens-Illinois in the amount of
$235,000, against Porter Hayden in the
amount of$2,500 and against Celotex
Corporation ("Celotex") in the amount
of $372,000.
All defendants, except Celotex, appealed the awards to the Court ofSpecial Appeals of Maryland. The court
affirmed all aspects of the awards for
compensatory damages. It also affirmed the awards of punitive damages
against Owens-Illinois, but reversed
the awards ofpunitive damages against
Porter Hayden. Owens-Illinois challenged the award of punitive damages
to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The court granted certiorari and ordered the parties to address the issue of
what the correct standard should be for
an award of punitive damages in negligence and products liability in Maryland. Owens-Illinois, 601 A.2d at 647.
The court began its review of punitive damages by noting concern over
the recent proliferation ofpuniti ve damages claims, awards, and amounts of
awards in tort cases. Id. at 648 (citing
2 James D. GhiardiandJohnJ. Kircher,
Punitive Damages Law and Practice §
2l.01, at 2 (1985)). "Accompanying
this increase in punitive damages
claims, awards and amounts ofawards,"
the court opined, "[was] renewed criticism of the concept of punitive damages in a tort system designed primarily to compensate injured parties for
harm." Id. The court asserted that such
criticism was justified because "juries
[were] provided with imprecise and
uncertain characterizations ofthe type
of conduct which [would] expose a

defendant to a potential award ofpunitive damages." Id. Moreover, the
court noted that the trial court and the
court of special appeals had required
the plaintiffs to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendants
had acted with "implied malice." Id.
Although this standard was consistent
with Maryland law, the plaintiffs were
not required to show "actual malice,"
which historically had been a concomitant of punitive damages. Thus,
the court concluded that it was necessary to re-evaluate the basic standard
ofwrongful conduct which would give
rise to punitive damages awards in
negligence actions generally, and product liability cases specifically. Id.
The court began its re-examination
of punitive damages under Maryland
law by overruling H&R Block v.
Testerman, 338 A.2d 48 (Md. 1975)
and Wedeman v. City Chevrolet, 366
A.2d 7 (Md. 1976), summarily abandoning the "arising out of contract"
distinction, which had existed for the
purpose ofawarding punitive damages
in tort actions involving a contractual
relationship. Owens-Illinois, 601 A.2d
at 649. "Under the TestermanWedeman rule ... the basic standard
for exposure to punitive damage liability would vary depending on whether
the wrongful conduct took place before or after the formation of the contract." Id. The court emphasized that
the historical purposes ofpunitive damages were punishment and deterrence,
and accordingly punitive awards should
be based exclusively upon the "heinous nature of the defendant's tortious
conduct." Id. (citingSchaeferv. Miller,
587 A.2d 491,503 (Md. 1991)). Because the Testerman- Wedeman rule focused on when a defendant acted, instead of how a defendant acted, the
court found it inconsistent with the
established purposes of punitive damages, and therefore, bad law. I d. at 650.
Next, the court re-examined the
standard of conduct which governed
an award of punitive damages. Until
1972, Maryland courts applied the "actual malice" standard of conduct. Id.

In Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co.,
297 A.2d 721 (Md. 1972), however,
the court of appeals allowed an award
of punitive damages based upon "implied malice" for the first time in a nonintentional tort case. Owens-Illinois,
601 A.2d at 650 (citing Smith, 297
A.2d at 731). The court criticized the
adoption of the implied malice standard as having "led to inconsistent
results and frustration ofthe purposes
of punitive damages ...." Id. at 651
(citing Schaefer, 587 A.2d at 508).
Moreover, the court noted that such
awards were arbitrary and unpredictable and thus, could not serve their
primary purpose of deterrence. Therefore, the court overruled Smith and its
progeny and reinstated an "actual malice" standard for all non-intentional
tort actions. Id at 652. The court
defined "actual malice" as conduct that
"was characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud." Id. at
652-53 (citing Davis v. Gordon, 36
A.2d 699, 701 (Md. 1944)).
Next, the court recognized that "actual malice," as they had defined the
term, did not readily lend itself to a
typical products liability case because
ofthe remote chance that a victim of a
dangerous product could establish that
a manufacturer or supplier specifically
intended to harm a particular consumer.
Id. at 653. Consequently, the court
clarified the test for determining
whether "actual malice" existed in a
products liability case. In such cases a
plaintiff must prove· that a defendant
had actual knowledge ofthe defect and
deliberately disregarded the foreseeable harm to the consumer. Id.
Finally, the court reached the issue
of which standard of proof should be
required for an award of punitive damages. The court observed that "[t]he
function of the standard of proof is to
'allocate the risk of error between the
litigants and to indicate the relative
importance attached to the ultimate
decision. ,,, Id. at 655 (quoting
Addingtonv. Texas, 441 U.S.418,423
(1979)). The court noted that Maryland already required the clear and
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ian reemployment.
William "Sky" King, a member of
the Alabama National Guard, applied
655-56(citingFirstNat'IBankv. us.F. to become a Command Sergeant Ma& G. Co., 340 A.2d 275 (Md. 1975)}. jor in the Active Guard/Reserve
The court concluded that in order to ("AGR"}program. Athreeyeartourof
further the purposes inherent in puni- duty was required by army regulations
tive damages and because of their pe- of the person holding that position.
nal nature the "[u]se of a clear and Upon learning ofhis appointment, King
convincing standard of proof [would] notified his employer, St. Vincent's
help to insure that punitive damages Hospital, of his acceptance, requested
[were] properly awarded." Id. at 657. a three year leave of absence, and reIn Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, the ported for duty as ordered. Several
court of appeals clearly attempted to weeks later, St. Vincent's notified him
"fix" Maryland law regarding jury that his request was unreasonable and
awards of punitive damages. How- was therefore beyond the Act's guarever, in adjusting the scales ofjustice, antee of reemployment. St. Vincent's
the court simply tilted the scales in the then brought an action fora declaratory
opposite direction. While the elimina- judgment in the United States District
tion of the "arising out of contract" Court for the District of Northern Aladistinction was appropriate in light of bama to settle the question of whether
the arbitrariness ofthe rule, and the use the applicable terms of the Act provide
of clear and convincing evidence stan- reemployment rights after tours ofduty
dard was justified by the penal impli- as long as King's.
The district court held that service
cation of punitive damages, the court
tilted the scales in favor of the defen- in the AGR program was protected
dant when it adopted the "actual mal- under section 2024(d), but that a three
ice" standard of conduct. As a result, year leave ofabsence was per se unreaplaintiffs who clearly have been the sonable. King, 112 S. Ct. at 572. The
victims of a grossly negligent defen- court's reasoning paralleled the opindant will find little redress in the Mary- ions of the third, fifth and eleventh
circuits which had held that leave reland courts.
quests under section 2024(d} must meet
- Laurie Ann Garey a test of reasonableness. A panel ofthe
eleventh circuit affirmed the district
Kingv. St. Vincent'sHospital: MEM- court's decision. Due in part to the fact
BERS OF THE ARMED FORCES that the fourth circuit had declined to
RETAIN THE RIGHT TO CIVIL- accept a reasonableness standard, the
IAN REEMPLOYMENT UNDER Supreme Court granted certiorari to
38 U.S.C. § 2024(d} REGARDLESS resolve the conflict among the circuits.
OF THE DURATION OF ACTIVE
The Supreme Court began its analyDUTY.
sis by recognizing the importance of
Justice Souter, writing for a unani- the wording of section 2024(d), which
mous court, authored King v. St. contains no express time limitations.
Vincent'sHosp., 112 S. Ct. 570(1991}, The Court noted that the fourth circuit
which resolved the conflict surround- had found that the words appear to
ing the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. guarantee that leave and reemployment
section 2024(d}(1981 & Supp. 1992}, be "unequivocal and unqualified,"
which is known as the Veterans' whereas the eleventh circuit had acReemployment Rights Act. The Court knowledged that the subsection "does
held that section 2024(d} does not im- not address the 'reasonableness' of a
plicitly limit the length of military reservist's leave request". King, 112
service after which a member of the S. Ct. at 573 (quoting Kolkhorst v.
armed forces retains the right to civil- Tilghman, 897 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th
convincing evidence standard in civil
cases when "fraud, dishonesty, orcriminal conduct [was] imputed ...." Id. at
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Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 865
(1992»; Gulf States Paper Corp. v.
Ingraham, 811 F.2d 1464, 1468 (11th
Cir. 1987)}. St. Vincent's argued that
"leave," as used in subsection (d), applies to an "employee," implying that
the employment relationship continues during the employee's absence and
that this relationship is incompatible
with a leave as long as King's. St.
Vincent's further argued that a leave of
this duration would create a burden on
the hospital to temporarily fill King's
position for three years until he re-'
turned to resume his job.
The Court responded by first recognizing that there is a burden placed on
employers by this section, however,
the Court found that it was not "free to
tinker with the statutory scheme." King,
112 S. Ct. at 573. The Court further
stated that it could not render the statute "susceptible to interpretive choice"
no matter how great the burden. Id. In
analyzing the statutory scheme, the
Court noted that while "subsection (d)
is utterly silent about any durational
limit on the protection it provides,
other subsections of section 2024, protecting other classes of full-time service personnel, expressly limit the periods of their protection." King, 112
S.Ct. at 573-74. From this, the Court
concluded that the simplicity of subsection (d) was deliberate and intended
to provide its benefit without imposing
conditions on the length of service.
The Court also explained that it followed the "cardinal rule that a statute is
to be read as a whole," and ''the canon
that provisions for benefits to members of the Anned Services are to be
construed in the beneficiaries favor."
Id. at 574.
The Court next addressed st.
Vincent's misapplication of the principle that a statute is to be read as a
whole. Although the hospital read the
statutory scheme to show a hierarchy
ofreemployment rights, the Court held
that the differences in treatment among
the various sections of the Act do not
necessarily amount to a hierarchy. Id.
at 574. Instead, the Court stated that

